The conjuncture that ushered in the era of shareholder value served to embed capital market expectations into corporate governance aligning management and shareholder interests. Market arbitrage focussed on modifying contractual relations with stakeholders to extract a (higher) return on invested capital. In this article we focus on cash earnings on capital employed generated by the S&P 500 survivor group of firms covering the period 1990-2008. We use this financial data to construct three complementary perspectives on corporate financial performance: firm, firm-relative and macro. Within this framework the financial numbers and perspectives are analogous to a hall of mirrors where ambiguity and contradiction are in play frustrating the construction of straightforward narratives about strategic purpose and financial outcome. Rather than abandon the approach we argue it has technical merit because it provides the basis to construct alternative critical narrative(s) that explore the limits to strategic purpose and corporate financial transformation in an era of shareholder value.
Introduction
From being a sporadic trait, of doubtful legitimacy, in the old days of the "natural" and "money" economy, the rate of profits or earnings on investment has in the nineteenth century come to take the central and dominant place in the economic system. Capitalization, credit extensions, and even the productiveness and legitimacy of any given employment of labor, are referred to the rate of earnings as their final test and substantial ground. (Thorstein Veblen, 1904:47) The primary goal of the corporate managers of such companies was to maximize the value of their common stock. Veblen put corporation finance as the centerpiece of his analysis of large, acquisition-minded companies. In Veblen's analysis, the corporate finance structure was capitalized on the earnings capacity of the corporation as a going concern (cited in Ganly, 2004) .
In Business Enterprise 1904 Veblen is concerned with owner-managers quest to increase the rate of profits or earnings on investment or as Ganley (2004) observes corporate earnings capacity which provides the platform for stock market valuation, and thus wealth accumulation for stockholders. Veblen observes that in the modern corporation a complex network of business relations are managed where contractual negotiation and shrewd manipulation are at the centre of things. This position on the firm as a network of contracts up for continual re-negotiation contrasts with Coase (1937) , whose objective was to understand why there are firms. That is, under what circumstances do firms establish contracts and consolidate financial transactions that, might otherwise, have been executed by a market mechanism. Veblen s observation about how owner-managers manipulate contracts with stakeholders for the purpose of boosting earnings capacity and wealth accumulation for owner-managers is insightful and informs the structuring of this paper. Jensen et al (1976) , in a later period, was concerned with the gap that operated between what managers were doing with corporate excess cash resources and the demands of investors for maximum return on capital employed. Jensen s argument was that debt finance, with its contractual obligation to pay interest, would force managers either to invest in positive Net Present Value (NPV) investment projects or distribute the free cash back to shareholders. The conjuncture that ushered in the era of shareholder value during the past two decades progressively aligned managerial and shareholder interest closing the principal-agent gap identified by Jensen (Rappaport, 1986 , Stern Stuart, 2002 . A critical literature identifies contradictory outcomes, for example, suggesting that the era of shareholder value encouraged a policy of downsize and distribute by US firms that undermined competitiveness (Lazonick and O Sullivan, 2000, Lazonick, 2008) . Froud et al (2006) emphasise the discrepancy between managerial narratives and financial numbers where transformation, in a world where strategy is financialized, is often disappointing. This paper builds on the approach taken by Froud et al where financial numbers are deployed to construct alternative critically engaged narratives. Our financial numbers framework of analysis is grounded in accounting to make visible earnings capacity (cash return on capital employed) and our approach takes the form of series of perspectives on financial performance: firm, firm-relative and macro using the S&P 500 survivor group 1 of firms. Froud et al observe that company narratives exist in a context that often includes industry narratives and grand narratives of macroeconomic trajectory recommending that analysis needs to distinguish different micro-, meso-and macro narratives whose interrelation can involve contest and challenge as much as support and confirmation (Froud et al, 2006:126 In this section we conceptualise corporate strategy financialized using three organizing elements: first the notion of conjunctural break where managerial and shareholder interests align in an era of shareholder value, second market arbitrage to describe how managers (as agents) exploit disturbances between and within markets to modify stakeholder contracts, and third a financial framework to reveal firm, firmrelative and macro perspectives on earnings capacity. Our purpose is to employ the financial numbers and perspectives on financial performance to construct alternative critical narratives about financial transformation in the S&P 500.
Conjunctural break: aligning managerial and investor interests
In Veblen s text on Business Enterprise owner-managers are at the centre of things in terms of understanding how corporate finance and physical resources can be deployed to increase earnings capacity and market capitalization for investors. In a later period,
Chandler observes that family owner-managers became increasingly decoupled from the strategic and day to day management of the American corporation.
Owners continued to participate as full-time executives in decisions establishing top-level policy and resource allocation. But in making even these decisions the family members worked closely with full-time salaried top-and middle-level managers who had little or no equity in the enterprise (Chandler, 1990:48) Consider the specific case of General Motors whose stockholders increased from 1,900 (1917) to 343,000 (1936) where over eighty percent of these stockholders held less than 50 shares each (GM Archive, US). Hannah (2007) reveals the extent of the separation of ownership and control in the US but is more cautious about using capital market modernity as an explanation for US superior economic performance. (Hannah, 2007: 36) Arising out of the separation of ownership from control is the argument that managers, as agents might deliver less than the maximum earnings on investor s capital when interests of managers and investors diverge. Jensen and Meckling (1976) are concerned that corporate resources would find their way into investment projects that delivered less than an optimal return for the shareholder-investor. Jensen (1986) introduces the concept of free cash flow to reveal agency cost as resulting from managers investing in negative Net Present Value (NPV) projects. To limit this behaviour Jensen agues that debt finance, with its contractual requirement to return interest and principal sum to the investor, would act as a disciplinary instrument forcing managers to ensure that returns on investment exceeded the cost of capital.
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies (Jensen 1986: 230) A more recent literature on the financialization of strategy (Lazonick and O Sullivan 2000 , Froud et al 2006 , Millberg, 2008 , Millberg and Winkler, 2009 The conjuncture ushering in an era of shareholder value increases the pressure on managers to extract a higher return on capital invested, for example, modifying the alchemy of business models to boost shareholder value and increase the probability of a higher stock market valuation and wealth accumulation for shareholders (Feng et al, 2001 ). Millberg (2008) argues that US firms recalibrated their global organisation of production through out-sourcing and off-shoring to extract additional cash from operations. This additional cash resource distributed as dividends, share buy-backs and cash acquisitions to shareholders (Andersson et al, 2007 and Lazonick, 2008) where the demands of financial institutions that manage share capital becomes incorporated into corporate governance structures and incentives driving managerial remuneration and bonus contracts (Andersson, 2009 ). Many senior executives have remuneration packages that stress meeting certain financial targets such as: earnings per share (EPS), cash and profit return on assets / capital employed, and Economic
Value Added (EVA ) relative to a selected peer group or industry sector. All of these performance metrics combine earnings (as profit or cash) and a measure of capital employed where the general objective is to boost earnings capacity (profit or cash generated per financial unit of capital employed) relative to other firms in a competition of all against all.
2.2
Arbitraging markets for financial gain.
Coase s (1937) seminal paper on transactions costs is concerned with why there are firms and observes that firms exist and survive where the cost of organizing transactions within the firm are lower than the costs of organising in another firm or leaving transactions to be organised by the market (Coase, 1937:14) . The transaction cost itself, according to Coase (1960) , is connected with the need to: discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed (Coase, 1960:15) . Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1981 , Williamson and Winter (1993) explain how alternative forms of organisation structure arise where the objective is to reduce the cost of negotiation and enforcement embodied in the organisation and expense of transacting.
Difficulties arise, however, when trying to identify transaction costs in financial statements and reconciling the variety of theoretical approaches employed to explain why transactions congeal into organisations rather than left to the market.
Rather than try to identify transaction costs and justify why there are firms and how transaction costs can lead to the development of particular forms of organisation we are interested in the issues of negotiation, bargain and resultant contract. Veblen (1904) , observed how the development of modern corporation finance resulted in a more complex network of business relations where contractual negotiation and shrewd manipulation are important. And that this mediation is through pecuniary transactions carried out for business ends rather than from simply a narrow efficiency of industry perspective. Veblen s observations on pecuniary negotiation separates the businessman from the rest of society because they are able to exert discretion and position to exploit change and disturbances in and across markets to (possibly) boost earnings capacity and increase the probability of wealth accumulation for ownermanagers.
In proportion as the machine industry gained ground, and as the modern concatenation of industrial processes and of markets developed, the conjunctures of business grew more varied and of larger scope at the same time that they became more amenable to shrewd manipulation.....
The adjustments of industry take place through the mediation of pecuniary transactions, and these transactions take place at the hands of the business men and are carried on by them for business ends, not for industrial ends in the narrower meaning of the phrase. (Veblen 1904:17-18) In this article we take the position that managers (as agents) deploy corporate resources to modify the firm s networks to arbitrage stakeholder contracts that are located in various markets. The Oxford Pocket Dictionary describes arbitrage as the simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or commodities in different markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage of differing prices . This definition drifts towards a narrow financial markets perspective where the traffic of transactions is predominantly located in specific markets where relatively standardised contracts are traded, for example, currencies or securities. In a narrow financial markets use the term arbitrage describes the exploitation of price differentials to earn a profit margin after commission fees. In this article we employ the term market arbitrage to describe how negotiations modify contracts with corporate stakeholders across and within markets to establish permanent or temporary control over resources. Managers, arbitrage markets to exploit physical, financial and temporal asymmetries where these differences offer the possibility of financial leverage and a boost to earnings capacity for corporate shareholders.
2.3
Revealing financial performance and earnings capacity.
In this section, we construct a financial model of the firm that reveals earnings capacity as a variable outcome of arbitrage within and across markets. Constructing 
In practice, value retention is calculated using equation 2 and bought-in-material and services (IC) calculated as residual when sales revenues (R) and value retention (VR)
are known in equation 1, as bought-in-material is not normally published by public quoted firms. The value retention computation in equation (2) is computed additively as the summation of its distributed elements. The residual after deducting wages and salaries (W) describes cash from operations or the more popular Earnings before
Interest Tax and Depreciation (EBITDA). EBITDA revealing how much cash is generated from operating activities conducted by the firm and is a key element in shareholder value metrics.
Cash from operations (EBITDA) is calculated;
Subtractively as:
Additively as:
To complete a financial model that describes a firm s earnings capacity it is necessary to introduce a measure of the stock of capital employed which is a summation of interest demanding capital, normally debt and shareholder equity taken from the balance sheet. This earnings capacity (the cash return on capital employed) shown in equation (5) as cash return on capital employed (Cash ROCE):
This approach of formatting a financial model the firm s earnings capacity for value creation has the advantage of revealing stakeholder expenses arising from intervention is various markets and their deduction from sales revenue. Identifying the share of external procurements in sales revenue, value retention and its distribution to employees (labour market), and dividends and net interest paid (capital market).
Deducting labour costs from value retained reveals the cash generated from operations (EBITDA) and this can be set against the stock of capital employed (as debt and equity funds) for both value creation and value absorption for shareholders (Andersson et al, 2008a) . We can aggregate financial information for a group of firms (the reference group) to calibrate one firm s relative financial performance against the others or present aggregate averages. In the following section we construct three analytical perspectives to account for the transformation in earnings capacity of S&P 500 survivor firms during the period 1990 to 2008.
3. Accounting for transformation in the S&P 500 1990-2008.
In this section we construct a series of perspectives to account for the transformation in earnings capacity in the S&P 500 survivor group. We start at the firm level and deconstruct earnings capacity before turning to construct a firm-relative and macro aggregate account of changes in cash return on capital employed in the S&P500. All three perspectives are necessary to construct a critical account that explores the extent of financial transformation (earnings capacity) in the S&P 500 survivor group.
Firm level financial performance
We start by constructing a hypothetical example to reveal a spectrum of possible earnings capacity outcome(s) and these are shown in (Jacobides, 2003) reconfigures the mix of activities undertaken by the firm and where internal cost reduction is not offset by increased external input costs and balance sheet capitalization. Gereffi (1994) shows how leading brand companies sought to restructure their global value chains and the implications this has for governance, technical transfer, division of competences and (Sturgeon 1997, Lee and Chen 2000) how power within global markets utilised to extract higher returns (Kaplan and Kaplinsky 1998). Bank of America generates net revenues from interest and non-interest income and after deducting interest expense and all other external charges for services provided net revenue retained in the bank was 28 percent of sales out of which 45% is then used to cover employee expenses leaving cash from operations at 15 percent of net revenues. By 2008 the share of cash generated out of net revenues had increased to 20 percent due to a reduction in external costs. However, capital intensity (shareholder equity in this case) increased by a factor of three so as to maintain capital adequacy ratios in line with the growth in assets (including securitized loans). Bank of Americas shareholder equity had increased at a faster rate than cash extracted out of net income reducing cash share of equity from 31 to 13 percent and incidentally also reducing the margin of safety from loan defaults and charge-offs (Heilpern et al, 2008) .
These illustrative firm level cases reveal how arbitrage interventions and contractual re-negotiation with stakeholders across markets often do not align to increase earnings capacity. The financial framework of analysis permits a deconstruction of earnings capacity into its constituent market driven elements (product, procurement, labour and capital) to reveal how contradiction and ambiguity play out.
Relative financial performance
The remuneration packages of senior executives are often tied to relative performance metrics, for example, Pfizer and Ford Motor connect executive compensation to the relative to the performance of a Peer Group
The (remuneration) Committee continues to believe that total shareholder return is the most appropriate measure of relative performance in relation to Pfizer s business objectives and therefore selected relative total shareholder return as the sole performance measure for the 2009 PSA cycle. In the Committee s view our relative total shareholder return compared with the pharmaceutical peer group remained strategic priority during this period. During 1990 to 1999, the S&P 500 survivor group increased cash extracted out of sales revenues but this coincided with an increase in balance sheet capitalization (long-term debt plus equity) which increased relative to sales revenue. From 65 cents of capital employed per dollar of sales in 1990 to $1.14 of capital employed per dollar of sales. Andersson et al (2008b) have argued that this is partially explained by the fact that corporate purchases (mergers/acquisitions) were progressively accounted for at market value (rather than pooled) during the last decade and a half. Although the US corporate sector has been under pressure to generate additional cash out of capital employed for shareholders aggregate earnings capacity (cash earnings on capital employed) was not transformed in the S&P 500 survivor group.
Discussion / Summary
In this paper we have argued that corporate governance internalized the interests of institutional shareholders forcing managers to exploit market arbitrage, re-negotiate contractual relations with stakeholders, to boost earnings capacity (cash earnings on capital employed). As Veblen observed, managers were executing shrewd contractual negotiation and deal making to boost earnings capacity, and increasing the probability of wealth accumulation for shareholders.
Our objective in this paper has been to reveal financial performance in the S&P 500 survivor group employing a financial performance framework of analysis to make visible three complementary perspectives or levels of analysis: firm, firm-relative and macro. These three perspectives on financial performance facilitate the construction of critical narratives about financial transformation in an era of shareholder value in the S&P 500.
At the level of the firm we employ this financial framework to deconstruct bottom line earnings capacity to show how interventions across and within specific markets/stakeholders are difficult to align because contradictory forces are in play.
Out-sourcing, off-shoring, and mergers may not deliver increased earnings capacity if, for example: higher external costs in income are not offset by a reduction in internal labour costs or, the market value of corporate acquisitions inflates balance sheet capitalization ahead of cash earnings. Relative performance is also a key ingredient in the structuring of incentives aligning managerial and shareholder financial interests.
In this paper we reveal firm performance against all S&P 500 survivors (the reference group) from which we can observe the extent to which migration is positive (Pfizer) or negative (Ford). This analysis not only reveals a pattern of winners and losers, but also how one firms relative performance changes as much from its own actions as those carried out (or not) by others in the reference group. To put relative corporate performance into perspective it is also necessary to construct an account of aggregate macro financial performance for the S&P survivor group to reveal level and trajectory.
During the period 1990 to 2008, an era of shareholder value, we find that the S&P 500 survivor group did not, on average, transform earnings capacity.
Our focus has been with accounting for earnings capacity in the S&P 500 group of survivors at a firm, firm-relative and macro level. Within this realm of financial numbers and perspectives the analogy is with the hall of mirrors where ambiguity and contradiction are in play frustrating straightforward narratives that connect strategic purpose to financial outcome. Rather than abandon this framework of analysis we argue that this approach has technical merit because it facilitates the production of alternative critical narrative(s). These could, for example, be contrasted with those that present a stronger argument supporting a relation between strategic purpose and corporate financial transformation in an era of shareholder value.
